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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
ruling of the trial court was too inconsequential to adversely affect any substantial right of the defendant in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. 6
Had this remark been systematically repeated the prejudice sustained would
have been great, and reversal proper, but a new trial is unwarranted in this
case where the remark was isolated and therefore falling within Section 542
of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The decision in the instant case is a culmination of a warning advanced
sixty years ago, 67 manifested in the dissenting opinions of many previous
cases, 68 which stated that a prosecuting attorney should put himself under
proper restraint and should not, in his remarks to the jury, go beyond the
evidence.
CoRRoBoRATIoN Or TESTIMONY OF ACCOMPLICE

The Code of Criminal Procedure Section 399 states, "A conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice unless he be corroborated by
such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the commission
of the crime." In the case of People v. Weiss,' a small store was robbed by
five men, four of whom were apprehended, convicted, and were awaiting
sentence 4t the time of the present case. The defendant Weiss was allegedly
the fifth robber. Two of those convicted testified for the People and implicated
Weiss. The other two were called by the defendant and, contrary to expectations, also implicated the defendant. The owner of the store testified that "I
couldn't say with certainty that this (Weiss) is the man," and "I looked at
him but I wouldn't remember his face because I was frightened," and "I
think it's the same man."
The issue of this case was whether the testimony of the store owner was
sufficient to corroborate the accomplices who testified for the people. The
People argued that such testimony did satisfy the "tends to connect" requirement of Section 399, whereas the defendant contended such testimony was too
vague. The Court, in affirming the conviction, held that positive identification
is not the minimum standard, but that it is sufficient that the owner believed
Weiss was the fifth robber and that the jury believed the owner.
The People also argued that assuming, arguendo, the owner's testimony
did not corroborate the accomplices who testified for the People, since the
defendant's own witnesses also implicated him, he must be convicted, because
Section 399 does not apply to testimony given by an accomplice called by the
defense. The Court held that since the owner's testimony was sufficient to
corroborate the People's witnesses, this question need not be decided.
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